The responsible gaming sector has gained momentum – new self-exclusion registries launching, expanded research funding, and regulators worldwide sharpening their focus on player protection. As this momentum has built, three persistent questions have demanded clearer answers.

Some of the debates have proved more nuanced than headlines suggest. Others have revealed genuine gaps that no single jurisdiction has fully solved. What has emerged is a clearer picture of what actually works and what remains to be built.

  1 . The Cross-Border Exclusion Gap The problem in practice  Self-exclusion registries work within their borders. The Netherlands’ CRUKS system reached 100,000 registrations by mid-2025, with 300–500 people signing up weekly. Germany’s OASIS processed over 320,000 new exclusions in 2024 alone. France’s new digital registry has seen rapid adoption since going fully online.  But here’s the friction point: a vulnerable player excluded in one jurisdiction faces no barriers to gambling in another. Research consistently shows that determined problem gamblers seek workarounds, often landing on offshore or unregulated platforms that operate outside any exclusion framework.  The Dutch Gaming Authority floated an idea that gained attention at industry conferences: an “Interpol for gambling” – a formal international network for cross-border cooperation. Seven European regulators (UK, France, Germany, Italy, Austria, Portugal, and Spain) issued a joint declaration committing to share information on illegal operators. But practical implementation remains elusive.  What we’re watching at Dataworks Group  The core tension is between privacy law (particularly GDPR constraints on sharing personal data across borders), jurisdictional sovereignty, and the technical reality that building interoperable systems requires more than political will – it requires architectural consensus.  Ontario’s recent court ruling allowing cross-border liquidity for poker players opens interesting questions about how jurisdictions might eventually harmonise player protection alongside market access.    2 . The Black Market Debate: Separating Signal from Noise  The headline numbers require context  Research commissioned by the European Casino Association suggested illegal gambling operators controlled 71% of European online gaming revenue in 2024. That figure generated attention – but it obscures a more nuanced reality.  Comprehensive analysis of channelisation rates across jurisdictions reveals that well-designed regulated markets consistently capture 91-97% of gambling activity. Great Britain achieves 97% channelisation. Italy reaches 94%. Denmark sustains 91.5% despite 66% of self-exclusion registrants choosing permanent lifetime bans. Ontario hit 92% within two years of launching its competitive market.  The UK Gambling Commission’s black market study identified four consumer groups using unlicensed platforms: self-excluders seeking workarounds, “skilled advocates” chasing better odds, “social explorers” discovering sites through communities, and “accidental tourists” who don’t realise they’re on illegal platforms. But crucially, the Commission found the UK’s unlicensed market represents just 2.1% of total online stakes – not a market-threatening problem in a well-designed regulatory environment.   What actually drives offshore demand  Academic research examining channelisation patterns finds product availability – not consumer protection tools – as the dominant predictor of offshore gambling. Self-exclusion bypass accounts for only 5-10% of offshore demand. Product restrictions and regulatory design explain 75-85%.  Germany provides the clearest example: despite implementing the comprehensive OASIS self-exclusion database with 320,000+ registered users, the country captures only 40-60% of online gambling. The culprit isn’t OASIS – it’s Germany’s restrictive product framework: limited in-play betting, just 347 permitted sporting events compared to Italy’s 1,900+, and a 5.3% turnover tax on slots.  Consumer surveys reinforce this pattern. Better bonuses and promotions drive 25-30% of offshore choice. Game variety accounts for 20-25%. Higher limits explain 15-20%. Cryptocurrency payment options motivate 15-18%. Self-exclusion circumvention? Just 5-10%.  Regulated markets continue growing  The industry argument that consumer protection measures drive players offshore deserves scrutiny. Australia’s BetStop – The National Self-Exclusion Register™ launched in August 2023 with mandatory integration across all licensed wagering operators. The result? Australian online gross gaming revenue grew 23.5% from $1.7 billion (2022) to $2.1 billion (2024). Market CAGR actually increased from 12.8% to 13.7%.  Self-exclusion systems demonstrably work for those who use them – GAMSTOP shows 75% effectiveness in the UK, BetStop – The National Self-Exclusion Register™ achieves 96% in Australia, Sweden’s Spelpaus reaches 72% – without damaging market health. The narrative that player protection drives black market growth doesn’t survive contact with the data.    3 . The Evidence Gap: We Don’t Know What Works The uncomfortable truth  Despite decades of responsible gambling initiatives, the sector lacks robust evidence on which interventions actually reduce harm. The UK’s Gambling Survey for Great Britain is advancing longitudinal research, but outcome data remains thin. The Netherlands invested €21 million through 2030 in gambling harm research—acknowledging that current prevention and treatment approaches rest on insufficient evidence.  Research published during 2025 highlighted uncomfortable patterns: many bettors recognise early signs of problematic behaviour but delay seeking help until significant harm has occurred. Cultural stigma, risk normalisation through promotional offers, and a “skill identity” among sports bettors all create barriers to early intervention—regardless of what tools operators provide.  Parliamentary inquiries across multiple jurisdictions have cited data gaps as a core obstacle to evidence-based policy. The World Health Organisation’s gambling harm framework emphasises evidence, but regulators struggle to access the behavioural data needed to test whether interventions work.  The privacy paradox  Here’s the bind: the data needed for meaningful research—longitudinal gambling behaviour, exclusion outcomes, intervention effectiveness—is precisely the data that cannot be shared under privacy law. Real player records are rightfully protected. But that protection creates a research vacuum.  Where Solutions Might Emerge  The challenges above share a common thread: they require coordination across jurisdictions, access to data that can’t be easily shared, and mechanisms to measure outcomes at scale. But we now have more evidence than ever about what works.  Self-exclusion systems demonstrably reduce harm  The data is increasingly robust: international self-exclusion systems achieve 72-96% effectiveness in stopping or reducing gambling behaviour. Australia’s BetStop – The National Self-Exclusion Register™ leads at 96%. The UK’s GAMSTOP reaches 75%. Sweden’s Spelpaus achieves 72% sustained abstinence. Longer exclusion periods (2+ years) show significantly better outcomes than short timeouts.  With $10.7 billion in annual national gambling harm in Australia alone and 96% of BetStop – The National Self-Exclusion Register™ users stopping or reducing gambling, the business case is clear. NSW projections suggest a self-exclusion register could deliver $2.1 billion in five-year net present value through avoided social harm costs.  Federated data infrastructure — rather than centralising sensitive player data, architectures that enable matching and analysis without exposing individual records. This is the direction Australia’s BetStop – The National Self-Exclusion Register™ demonstrates, and Ontario’s research ethics discussions hint at growing interest in extending these approaches.  Synthetic data for research — statistical models that replicate gambling behaviour patterns without using real player information. This would allow researchers to model intervention effectiveness, explore harm markers, and test policy scenarios without privacy breaches. The problem statement is clear: regulators and researchers lack access to gambling behaviour data needed for evidence-based policy. Real data cannot be shared due to privacy obligations. This creates a research gap that undermines harm prevention efforts.  Regulatory design over restriction stacking — the jurisdictions achieving highest channelisation rates (UK 97%, Italy 94%, Denmark 91.5%) share common characteristics: competitive licensing, comprehensive product offerings, reasonable taxation, and effective enforcement against illegal operators. Consumer protection tools work within well-designed markets, not as substitutes for regulatory architecture.  Earlier intervention triggers — AI-driven behavioural detection is improving, but the challenge isn’t technology. It’s cultural acceptance that gambling operators should proactively intervene when patterns suggest harm—and that players will engage with those interventions rather than seeking offshore alternatives.   

The Path Forward

Recent developments have clarified the questions which need to be addressed and provided stronger evidence about what works.

Self-exclusion systems achieve 72-96% effectiveness. Well-designed regulated markets capture 91-97% of gambling activity. Product restrictions, not consumer protection tools, drive offshore demand. The narrative that player protection damages market health doesn’t survive scrutiny: Australia’s online gambling grew 23.5% during BetStop – The National Self-Exclusion Register™‘s first year.

The jurisdictions that make progress will likely be those willing to invest in infrastructure – technical, legal, and cooperative – while designing regulatory frameworks that offer genuine product choice within licensed environments. The first jurisdiction to solve cross-border exclusion interoperability, the first research platform enabling privacy-preserving harm studies, the first comprehensive evidence base demonstrating intervention ROI across multiple markets – these will set standards others follow.

The evidence base is stronger than ever. The question is whether policy will follow.

  Dataworks Group operates self-exclusion infrastructure for regulated markets including Australia’s BetStop – The National Self-Exclusion Register™. Our roadmap includes investment in synthetic data research capabilities and federated privacy-preserving architectures. If you’re working on these challenges – as a regulator, researcher, or operator – we’d welcome a conversation.    About this piece  This analysis draws on regulatory announcements, enforcement data, peer-reviewed research, and government reports from 2025. Key sources include the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA), UK Gambling Commission, German OASIS reports, KPMG/Rethink gambling harm research, channelisation studies across 12 jurisdictions, and consumer motivation research.  References  Self-Exclusion System Data  BetStop – The National Self-Exclusion Register™ (Australia)  GAMSTOP (United Kingdom)  OASIS (Germany)  CRUKS (Netherlands)  Spelpaus (Sweden)  France Digital Registry  Market & Channelisation Data  United Kingdom  Netherlands  Germany  Italy  Denmark  Ontario, Canada  Australia  Black Market & Offshore Demand Research  European Black Market  UK Gambling Commission Black Market Study (2025)  Consumer Motivation Research  Seven-Regulator Joint Declaration  Regulatory Developments  Netherlands “Interpol for Gambling” Proposal  Netherlands Research Investment  UK Gambling Survey for Great Britain  Academic Literature  Gainsbury, S.M., Russell, A., Hing, N., Wood, R., Lubman, D.I., & Blaszczynski, A. (2015). “How the Internet is Changing Gambling: Findings from an Australian Prevalence Survey.” Journal of Gambling Studies, 31(1), 1–15.  Gainsbury, S.M., Russell, A., Blaszczynski, A., & Hing, N. (2015). “The interaction between gambling activities and modes of access: A comparison of Internet-only, land-based only, and mixed-mode gamblers.” Addictive Behaviors, 41, 34–40.  Hörnle, J., Littler, A., Tyson, G., et al. (2018). “Evaluation of Regulatory Tools for Enforcing Online Gambling Rules and Channelling Demand towards Controlled Offers.” European Commission.  Wardle, H., Reith, G., Langham, E., & Rogers, R.D. (2019). “Gambling and public health: we need policy action to prevent harm.” BMJ, 365, l1807.  Industry Sources  European Gaming and Betting Association (EGBA)  Betting and Gaming Council (BGC)  H2 Gambling Capital  Gemeinsame Glücksspielbehörde der Länder (GGL)  Data Reliability Note  Channelisation percentages are industry estimates with inherent methodological limitations. Offshore market measurement relies on payment flow analysis, consumer surveys, and web traffic data—each with documented constraints. Licensed operator GGY figures are tax-verified and audited. Self-exclusion registration counts are regulatory authority data. This paper weights verified regulatory data more heavily than offshore market estimates.